Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.

What Do We Expect from Our Friends?

We conduct a field experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in modified dictator games. While recipients’ beliefs accurately account for the extent to which friends will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e. directed altruism), recipients are not able to anticipate individual differences in the baseline altruism of allocators (measured by giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity towards named recipients). Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many common friends, are no more accurate in recognizing intrinsically altruistic allocators. Recipient beliefs are significantly less accurate than the predictions of an econometrician who knows the allocator’s demographic characteristics and social distance, suggesting recipients do not have information on unobservable characteristics of the allocator.dictator games, beliefs, baseline altruism, directed altruism, social networks

What Do We Expect from Our Friends?

We conduct a field experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in modified dictator games. While recipients beliefs accurately account for the extent to which friends will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e. directed altruism), recipients are not able to anticipate individual differences in the baseline altruism of allocators (measured by giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity towards named recipients). Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many common friends, are no more accurate in recognizing intrinsically altruistic allocators. Recipient be- liefs are significantly less accurate than the predictions of an econometrician who knows the allocators demographic characteristics and social distance, suggesting recipients do not have information on unobservable characteristics of the allocator.dictator games, beliefs, baseline altruism, directed altruism, social networks

Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks

We conduct online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52 percent relative to random strangers, while future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24 percent when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.modified dictator games, directed altruism, enforced reciprocity, social networks

Managing Self-Confidence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Evidence from social psychology suggests that agents process information about their own ability in a biased manner. This evidence has motivated exciting research in behavioral economics, but has also garnered critics who point out that it is potentially consistent with standard Bayesian updating. We implement a direct experimental test. We study a large sample of 656 undergraduate students, tracking the evolution of their beliefs about their own relative performance on an IQ test as they receive noisy feedback from a known data-generating process. Our design lets us repeatedly measure the complete relevant belief distribution incentive-compatibly. We find that subjects (1) place approximately full weight on their priors, but (2) are asymmetric, over-weighting positive feedback relative to negative, and (3) conservative, updating too little in response to both positive and negative signals. These biases are substantially less pronounced in a placebo experiment where ego is not at stake. We also find that (4) a substantial portion of subjects are averse to receiving information about their ability, and that (5) less confident subjects are causally more likely to be averse. We unify these phenomena by showing that they all arise naturally in a simple model of optimally biased Bayesian information processing.

Evaluating the scale, growth, and origins of right-wing echo chambers on YouTube

Although it is understudied relative to other social media platforms, YouTube is arguably the largest and most engaging online media consumption platform in the world. Recently, YouTube's outsize influence has sparked concerns that its recommendation algorithm systematically directs users to radical right-wing content. Here we investigate these concerns with large scale longitudinal data of individuals' browsing behavior spanning January 2016 through December 2019. Consistent with previous work, we find that political news content accounts for a relatively small fraction (11%) of consumption on YouTube, and is dominated by mainstream and largely centrist sources. However, we also find evidence for a small but growing "echo chamber" of far-right content consumption. Users in this community show higher engagement and greater "stickiness" than users who consume any other category of content. Moreover, YouTube accounts for an increasing fraction of these users' overall online news consumption. Finally, while the size, intensity, and growth of this echo chamber present real concerns, we find no evidence that they are caused by YouTube recommendations. Rather, consumption of radical content on YouTube appears to reflect broader patterns of news consumption across the web. Our results emphasize the importance of measuring consumption directly rather than inferring it from recommendations.Comment: 29 pages, 21 figures, 15 table

What Do We Expect from Our Friends?

Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00497.x</p

dOCRL maintains immune cell quiescence in Drosophila by regulating endosomal traffic

Lowe Syndrome is a developmental disorder characterized by eye, kidney, and neurological pathologies, and is caused by mutations in the phosphatidylinositol-5-phosphatase OCRL. OCRL plays diverse roles in endocytic and endolysosomal trafficking, cytokinesis, and ciliogenesis, but it is unclear which of these cellular functions underlie specific patient symptoms. Here, we show that mutation of Drosophila OCRL causes cell-autonomous activation of hemocytes, which are macrophage-like cells of the innate immune system. Among many cell biological defects that we identified in docrl mutant hemocytes, we pinpointed the cause of innate immune cell activation to reduced Rab11-dependent recycling traffic and concomitantly increased Rab7-dependent late endosome traffic. Loss of docrl amplifies multiple immune-relevant signals, including Toll, Jun kinase, and STAT, and leads to Rab11-sensitive mis-sorting and excessive secretion of the Toll ligand Spåtzle. Thus, docrl regulation of endosomal traffic maintains hemocytes in a poised, but quiescent state, suggesting mechanisms by which endosomal misregulation of signaling may contribute to symptoms of Lowe syndrome